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Mapmakers September 20, 2006

Posted by khalidmir in Writers.
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‘What is important is to keep our mind high in the world of true understanding, and returning to the world of our daily experience to seek therein the truth of beauty. No matter what we might be doing a at given moment , we must not forget that is has a bearing upon our everlasting self…’

—-Basho.

‘Since the wilful Twenties, the committals of the Thirties, it seems to me that my life as a man and as a writer has been spent on crossing and re-crossing frontiers and that is at the heart of any talent I have…Frontier life has been nourishing to me. Throwing something of oneself away is way of becoming, for the moment, other people and I have always thought that unselfing onself, speaking for others, justifying those who cannot speak, giving importance to the fact that they live, is especially the privilege of the storyteller, and even the critic-who is also an artist. A sign of old age in myself is that, knowing my time is limited, I find myself looking at the streets and their architecture much longer and more intensely and at Nature and landscape. I gaze at the plane tree at the end of the garden , studying its branches and leaves. I look a long time at flowers. As I am always on the watch for dramatic changes in the London sky… I store up the procession of headlands and terrifying ravines..and all of the landscapes that have formed me. ‘

V.S. Pritchett, As Old as the Century.

Camus: ‘ One of our contemporaries is cured of his torment by simply contemplating a landscape. ‘

‘…[t]hat not all promises would be kept, that some things are in fact irrevocable and that it had counted after all, every evasion and every procrastination, every mistake, every word, all of it.’

—-Joan Didion

‘These fragments I have  shored up against my ruins.’

T.S. Eliot

Some of these words are tinged with despair whilst others suggest a cool equanimity in the face of the dissolution that time and the world bring about. In both there is an attention to detail and only a hair’s breath separates the different tempers. Pritchett’s fabulous essay is the perfect example of a slow-burning happiness, of a style of writing that conveys a rock-like understanding of the world: a serene accumulation of experiences, an age-old trust in the certainties of the world, a keen awareness that in time all that is superfluous will be worn away and only the simple will remain. Perfection lies in the cadence of the voice, the eagle-eye that picks out a word from the many possibilities, in the miracle of how a word evokes not just its own lineage of comprehensions, that deep store of transmitted meanings with their subtle gradations that is embedded in the language-consciousness of a writer, but also in the way in which a particular word will interact with both those that are not chosen as well as the silences between it and other words.  It is as if the sheer passing of time confers on the writer a deeper sense of his surroundings, a greater appreciation of life’s still moments. There is a way of knowing that derives from becoming increasing estranged from the world and one’s life and there is another that comes from finding one’s place, the meridian of one’s life, and growing ever more deeply in love with it. There are mapmakers who never leave home and then there are those for whom the lonely, high seas beckon. For the latter it is the fragments that are the ruins…

Handedness September 15, 2006

Posted by khalidmir in Hands.
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Every great and profound experience would like to be insatiable, would like repetition and return to last until the end of all things, the restoration of an original situation from which it emerged…the transformation of the most upsetting [and joyous]  experience into habit: This is the essence of play.

—-W. Benjamin.

Each people’s gestures are determined by their response to the environment they live in and are a product of the type of work they are engaged in. These gestures are  carried over into all walks of life , from art to dance to language. These gestures become so internalised that one can meaningfully talk about a style of soul emanating from a particular region-a fundamental ’speech’ or set of gestures that is unique to a certain place. Through repetition the distinction between geography, history and nature gets blurred. Could it be that there is a religious vocation or temperament, say, that orders the body and the soul? And within these fixed categories -be they determined by work, landscape, an inner constitution or some combination of these elements- is there a further stratification along family lines? (I was once recognised by a cousin who had never seen me by the way in which I kept my head in my hands). Just as a household may have a ‘taqiya kalaam’ ( a set phrase) , might it not be the same when it comes to rudimentary gestures, the way one holds one’s hands?

A distinct landscape (urban, mountains, rural etc) can be associated with a particular relation with the body. It is said of the Bedouin Arabs that their expressions (linguistic and non-verbal) had remained unchanged-like the landscape itself-for thousands of years, chiseled down to a few quintessential self-revealing gestures of the soul. One is reminded of the hand positions of Buddhist statues that depict the interior state of the soul or the hands in Leonardo’s Last Supper.

But beyond this deep continuity between the land and gesture there is the desire to re-create it , to see it before our very eyes, and this is manifested in our Utopian projects, our sense of play. The city is, in this sense, not just an ordering of the soul, a pattern for the mind to follow, but a space that reconfigures our awareness of our bodies and those of other people. A way of binding and separating: the body politic.

—–Based on Plekhanov.

I’ve started so I will not finish. I’m struggling to complete even a single book. These are the books that I am currently wading through-some half completed, others only barely a chapter old and discarded: Herzog, Three-arched Bridge, Cabaret, Philosophy and Law , Goodbye to Berlin, Wind-up Bird Chronicles, Lawrence’s Essays, Dangling Man, Black Lamb, Grey Falcon, Language and Solitude, What Ought I To Do? 

Today I ‘ve given them all up and turned to Tallis’ Hand with its endlessly fascinating insights, though why one should renounce style in favour of ideas remains a mystery to me. The hand as the agent of action, knowledge and communication. On the handedness of the universe see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/science/lopsided.shtml

nolite conformari huic a seculo September 14, 2006

Posted by khalidmir in On Religion.
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There is something harsh, severe, rigid, and strict in religion. Concentrated, pure, crystalline, as hard as diamonds. To talk of freedom without limitations…one could equally talk about a heart that is constricted and knows no love. But there is something extreme in Christianity which doesn’t appeal to me (this is not a judgement and far less a moral position); we are only talking here of a compatibility with one’s temperament -and that is something that is utterly beyond one’s choice. Again, one has to tread carefully here since different tendencies are present in any one tradition. Islam has its asceticism, for example. And no-one would contest that its outward sobriety in certain matters is anything but a refined detachment or that half the religion is jalal and ‘awe’ and reticence. Add to this that the perspective is infused with the spirit of the ‘law’ and obedience rather than love and it is quite possible to come to just the opposite conclusion of what I am suggesting. One must also be aware that differences in perspectives narrow down considerably the more one’s actions and thoughts are centred on a truly religious life.

But be that as it is, there is something disconcerting-from the Christian perspective-about a religion that is so concerned about the good of this world and the good of the next. Behind such a concern there is always the hint of a suggestion that what we have here is a concession to worldliness and sensuality, a conformity to the strictures of an organised religion and not to the unbound spirit. Hagarism.

This confusion of perspectives is, of course, not always a result of bad faith. From a vantage point that stresses ‘the one thing needful’ or the truly singularly cosmic intervention of the divine into human affairs other faiths, or rather the possibility of other faiths, are not a pressing question. To ignore other meeting places and transitional stages between nature and grace-as Gustave Thibon puts it-in favour of the cross is not wholly surprising. Islam, on the other hand, emphasises a continuity of Revelation and is therefore essentially pluralistic. From its perspective it a truth that must already contain the truth of Christianity within it whereas from the latter’s point of view Islam will necessarily always be an outsider. Perhaps it is this that accounts for Islam’s supreme flexibility-a religion that could take in not only people from many different cultural backgrounds but whose theology could express itself at once in terms of Greek metaphysics and nomadic thought, a synthesis of civilisation and the desert (Medina and Mecca); more than anything else, the ‘world’ and the body were not looked at in a negative light but were themselves ‘ladders’ or bridges leading back to the holy. It is that sense of equilibrium and balance that minimised the fissures in the soul and the extreme tension (as George Steiner has it) between flesh and spirit, Revelation and History, time and the end of time that one detects in Christianity. One only has to compare this to the sublime the whole earth is a mosque to get an idea of the differences in contemplative attitudes.

But having said that, here are a few of my favourite words by an extremist-Simone Weil. I invariably find it exhausting reading her even in small doses, since it is as if one needed a superhuman effort to pay attention to a single point and that one is being made painfully aware of the inadequacies of one’s own soul; a quiet thought dawns on us: had we realised but one point, had the intelligence of mind and attentiveness of will, we would be as radically de-centred, de-created as her. 

  1. There is every degree of distance between the creature and God.A distance in which the love of God is impossible: matter, plants, animals. Evil is so complete there that it destroys itself: there is no longer any evil: mirror of divine innocence. We are at the point where love is just possible.
  2. We can say that we exist (to be placed outside) not that we are. God who is Being has in a sense effaced himself so that we can exist.
  3. Every sin is an attempt to fly from emptiness. We must also renounce the past and future, for the self is nothing but a coagulation of the past and future around a present that is always falling away.
  4. Time is the door to Eternity, not a substitute for it.
  5. [S]in springs from the desire to appear and dominate.
  6. When speaking of God’s ‘dependence’ on creatures one can say that things are true in the order of love and false in the order of being.
  7. We only attain to real prayer only after we have worn down our own will by keeping rules.
  8. We want the future to be there without ceasing to be the future.This is an absurdity of which eternity alone is the cure.
  9. It is God who in love withdraws from us so that we can love Him.For if we were exposed to the direct radiance of His love , without the protection of space, of time, and of matter, we should be evaporated like water in the sun.
  10. We must take the feeling of being at home into exile. We must be rooted in the absence of a place.
  11. To transfer the source of our actions outside ourselves. To be impelled. The purest of motives (or the basest: the law is always the same) appear as something exterior.
  12. To be only an intermediary between the uncultivated ground and the ploughed field, between the blank page and the poem.
  13. Idolatry comes from the fact that, whilst thirsting for absolute good, we do not possess the power of supernatural attention and we have not the patience to allow it to develop.
  14. It is because of this monotony [of evil] that quantity plays so great a part.
  15. Necessity is God’s veil. Limitation is proof that God loves us.
  16. Stars and blossoming fruit-trees: utter permanence and extreme fragility give an equal sense of eternity.
  17. We know by means of our intelligence that what the intelligence does not comprehend is more real than what it does comprehend. All that I conceive of as true is less true than those things of which I cannot conceive the truth, but which I love. The desire to discover something new prevents people from allowing their thoughts to dwell on the transcendent, indemonstrable meaning of what has already been discovered.
  18. It must be work in which the body constantly bears a part ..if this condition is not fulfilled then every change in our thinking is illusory.
  19. No human being should be deprived of his metaxu , that is to say of those relative and mixed blessings (home, country, traditions, culture etc) which warm and nourish the soul and without which, short of sainthood, a human life is not possible.     

Hearsay September 14, 2006

Posted by khalidmir in Music.
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It’s a modern day heresy to accept other people’s words and thoughts, ’sayings’ , or proverbs as our own since to do so only indicates the presence of a feeble, lazy mind, a dangerous falling back into heteronomy;authenticity demands that we think for ourselves, by ourselves, and that thought be independent of the world, tradition, or anything ‘given’. Conscience, a ‘knowing together’,is hardly possible any more as thought becomes more isolated, more abstract. Weisen has almost completely displaced Kenen. We, in so far as we are modern, have lost the ground beneath our feet, and our instinctive feel for things peters out, replaced by the ever more wild and fantastical flights of imagination of an inner-worldly sensibility.

It is not surprising, then, that our attention spans are so short and that the great storytellers are so rare. For in truth, we have lost the ability to listen and are less inclined to incorporate a truth that is not our own-in all senses of the word-into our lives.

The auditory imagination penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word; sinking to the most primitive and forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing something back, fusing the most ancient and the most civilised mentality.

—-T.S. Eliot

The eye is the organ of temptation; the ear of instruction.

—-Aristotle.

The ear sets into motion creative thought, helps us re-call, re-collect. It is “the eye that listens”, something that prepares us for the whole drama of life, that ‘oceanic feeling’ which is a sense of oneness. The first thing a child hears is the call to prayer that is whispered in his ear. Sight, our ability to make distinctions,is something on which our survival depends, and comes much later.

The essence of music is conflict, subversion and the capacity to bring even dissonance and different voices into a whole. The mechanical pattern that it establishes through repetition brings a certain sense of security-a music that comes ‘home’- but in such cases it is only a pattern of life, not a way of life.

Sound: the pressure of the vertical on the horizontal.

A note makes us take stock of the past and think about the future; neither one nor the other will ever be the same after the emergence of that note. In the same way, each person is unique and throws some light on the mystery of all those who have gone before him and all those who will follow him. Neither the past nor the future are inevitable. But the note, the music, always remains elusive: ” music does not become something, but something becomes music.”

(citations from Daniel Banenboim’s Reith lectures )

Anarchism September 13, 2006

Posted by khalidmir in Politics.
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fenians.gif      jpmorgan.jpg  Given this week’s focus on terrorist violence-wth the usual skirting around all issues remotely related to state violence it was interesting to read that the Fenians has apparently bombed the underground in 1883 and that the Times of London had then wondered if people would ever use the tube again. This also reminded me of the superb article by Mike Davis (http://www.newleftreview.net/?view=2355) where there is mention of the Italian anarchists who bombed Wall Street back in the early part of the 20 th century.

Volume 52, Number 9 · May 26, 2005

Review: William Pfaff

The Bullet’s Song: Romantic Violence and Utopia
by William Pfaff
Simon and Schuster, 368 pp., $27.95

In the early 1920s, during the first of his long spells in prison, Mohandas Gandhi read The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Many of his British friends had recommended it to him; they probably thought it a useful book for Gandhi to read while confronting a powerful empire. But Gandhi was only partly impressed by Gibbon. He admired Gibbon’s marshaling of “vast masses of facts.” But, as he put it, “facts are after all opinions.” He claimed that his Indian ancestors had done well to ignore history and seek philosophical wisdom in the Mahabharata, the account of a terrible war that apparently occurred in India in the first century BC. For, as he wrote, “that which is permanent and therefore necessary eludes the historian of events. Truth transcends history.”[1]

What was this permanent and necessary truth of the Mahabharata? Certainly it had little to do with affirming the greatness of extinct empires and civilizations or even with historical facts—the epic, as Gandhi emphasized, was full of supernatural events. The truth lay in the Mahabharata’s portrait of the elemental human forces of greed and hatred: how they disguise themselves as self-righteousness and lead to a destructive war in which there are no victors, only survivors inheriting an immense wasteland.

As Gandhi saw it, there was no clear-cut good or evil fighting for supremacy in the Mahabharata. The epic depicted a world full of ambiguities, where the battle between good and evil actually went on within individual souls, and where human beings had to make their own moral choices and strive for virtue. Though unconcerned with facts, the Mahabharata taught the importance of an ethical life based upon individual self-examination. History, Gandhi claimed, couldn’t do this, certainly not “history” as it is understood today, “as an aid to the evolution of our race.”

Gandhi was right to suspect that history in the twentieth century meant something more than how the first great historians Herodotus and Thucydides had seen it: as a record of events worth remembering or commemorating.[2] Many people in Western Europe, which had known a period of extraordinary dynamism in the nineteenth century, had concluded that history described humanity’s progress to a higher state of evolution—a rational process whose specific laws could be known and mastered just as accurately as processes in the natural sciences, and which backward natives in colonized societies could be persuaded or forced to duplicate.

The notion that history is a meaningful narrative of progress shaped by human beings existed in no major traditions of Asia or Africa. As William Pfaff pointed out almost four decades ago, modern Western culture had first “practiced the belief that the physical and social environment of man is subject to rational manipulation and that history is subject to the will and action of man.” It was the faith in rational manipulation that had powered the political, scientific, and technological revolutions of the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; it had also been used to explain and justify Western domination of the world.

Though not an intellectual, Gandhi had a shrewd underdog’s awareness of how powerful men from the world-conquering nations and empires of the West often obscured their worst excesses—slavery, massacres, despotism, and the destruction of traditional arts, crafts, and languages—by presenting themselves as the avant-garde of humanity’s march to a glorious future. He could sense that a quasi-scientific theory of history, which justified dishonorable means by pointing to noble ends, could, as Camus wrote in 1951, “be used for anything, even for transforming murderers into judges.”

1.

Writing during the cold war, Camus denounced Soviet Communists and their Western supporters for their blind faith in the ideology of history, which he held largely responsible for the great and peculiar violence of the twentieth century—”slave camps under the flag of freedom, massacres justified by philanthropy.”[3] But Camus failed to point out how a mode of reasoning that retrospectively justified past crimes and legitimized present ones for the sake of an unknown and unknowable future had been embraced by even those political elites that claimed to represent the “free world” or “Western civilization.”

As William Pfaff wrote in The Politics of Hysteria: The Sources of Twentieth-Century Conflict (1964), an original and provocative book he coauthored with Edmund Stillman, “The West does not like to admit this fact about itself”: that it “has been capable of violence on an appalling scale, and has justified that violence as indispensable to a heroic reform of society or of mankind.” He pointed out that “the atomic bomb, napalm, phosphorus raids, and indiscriminate area bombing were American and British techniques, used in a “mission of bringing liberty to the world.”

He asserted that the “passion to change history and the world” which admits “none of the compromise and quietism of certain other civilizations” has resulted in disasters on an unprecedented scale: how while shaping the extraordinary success of the West, this Faustian passion had also incited the West’s often brutal conquest of the world, and caused Europe itself in the twentieth century to degenerate, after the relatively peaceful nineteenth century, into two world wars, totalitarianism, and genocide. “To be a man of the modern West,” he wrote, “is to belong to a culture of incomparable originality and power; it is also to be implicated in incomparable crimes.”

Pfaff has continued to describe unsentimentally the full implications of the great material success of the West in his columns on international affairs for the International Herald Tribune, and such books as Condemned to Freedom (1971), The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism (1993), and Barbarian Sentiments: America in the New Century (2000). Before turning to intellectual journalism, Pfaff had served in the Korean War, and helped American “political warfare” against Soviet communism during the early years of the cold war. This experience appears to have made him particularly alert to the trauma and resentments of societies conquered or manipulated by the modern West.

His broad-ranging intellectual and emotional sympathies distinguish him from most foreign policy commentators who tend to serve what they see, usually narrowly, as their “national interest.” Pfaff is also indifferent to, and often brusquely dismissive of, the modish theories that describe how and why dominoes fall, history ends, and civilizations clash—”theoretical formulations” that Pfaff believes policymakers periodically come up with in order to legitimize “the huge material and intellectual investment American society has made in the apparatus of national defense and international engagement.”

In his new book, The Bullet’s Song: Romantic Violence and Utopia, a long essay on utopian violence, Pfaff returns to examining many of his themes —the Western faith in progress, the individual and national fantasies of changing history and the world. He reiterates his conviction that “the idea of total and redemptive transformation of human society through political means” is the “most influential myth of modern western political society from 1789 to the present days.” Pfaff is especially wary of its “naive American version,” which “although rarely recognized as such, survives, consisting in the belief that generalizing American-style political institutions and economic practices to the world at large will bring history (or at least historical progress) to its fulfillment.”

Some years before the Bush administration decided to spread democracy and freedom around the world, Pfaff had warned that although the “totalitarian utopian movements of the past ended with the collapse of Nazism and Marxism,” the “utopian impulse is not exhausted in the United States, where it has always been an element in the national sense of self.” “Americans,” Pfaff wrote in a recent column in the International Herald Tribune, “do not conceive of themselves as inheritors of a Western legacy of Promethean violence.” This may be because, as Pfaff asserts in his new book, “America largely excluded itself from the inner history of the twentieth century, which was written in Europe, and mostly at Europe’s expense.” Few Americans experienced the trauma of the destructive wars and totalitarian regimes that forced such European writers and thinkers as Paul Valéry, Robert Musil, Thomas Mann, Karl Jaspers, and Albert Camus to examine the larger assumptions of their compatriots, their hitherto unchallenged confidence that science or communism or free trade would create a bright future for humanity.

Pfaff, who has lived in Paris for many years, often writes in his columns about why Europeans, who have not forgotten their own disastrous experiments with utopia, are wary of the Bush administration’s mission to remake the world. Much of his new book reads as a cautionary tale for Americans in the new century, which, he notes, “has begun in futile manipulations of the intellectual remnants of progressive thought.” Its discursive, essayistic form combines memoirs and reflections on war with brief biographies of men and women who “saw in violence or its intellectual counterpart, manipulation, means to redemptive political change and the possibility to impose through action as well as art significant form upon historical materials and experience.”

Pfaff writes admiringly about Simone Weil, whose political activism and intellectual work flowed out of her spiritual ideals of self-examination, empathy, and compassion. But most of his biographical subjects are writers and artists with a craving for large-scale drama and publicity—people who wished to and often did change the world, if only for the worse. They include T.E. Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), who as a British intelligence officer during the First World War encouraged Arabs to revolt against their Ottoman overlords in Turkey; Ernst Jünger, the German author of the World War I memoir Storm of Steel and a former Nazi; Gabriele D’Annunzio, the nationalist Italian poet with a weakness for political drama; Willi Münzenberg, the Communist propagandist; André Malraux, the French novelist with a gift for self-fabrication; and Arthur Koestler, the Hungarian-English writer who embraced communism and anticommunism with equal fervor.

His tormented inner life makes T.E. Lawrence seem the most complex of Pfaff’ subjects. Lawrence spent four hard years imagining that he was bringing politica independence to Arabs suffering from Ottoman misrule. As it turned out, Britain an France divided up the Ottoman Empire into zones of influence after the First Worl War, leaving a mortified Lawrence to realize that he had been part of a British effort t secure the “corn and rice and oil of Mesopotamia.

Pfaff seems right to claim that Lawrence, though a self-confessed failure, has had a “very large and very strange” influence on the “Western mind.” His own early readings in Lawrence’s memoir Seven Pillars of Wisdom led Pfaff to join the military and US Special Forces, and then work as a “political warfare operator” during the early years of the cold war. In the 1940s and 1950s, the upper-class, Anglophilic members of the OSS and CIA seem to have had Lawrence of Arabia on their minds as they undermined governments they saw as unfriendly to the United States. Even as late as 2001, in an era of high-tech weapons, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appeared vulnerable to the myth of the brave white warrior leading barbaric tribes when, at a press conference during the war in Afghanistan, he proudly displayed blown-up pictures of Special Forces men on horseback helping Abdul Rashid Dostum, the brutal Afghan warlord, emerge from exile.[4]

Pfaff is less interested in the romantic role Lawrence created for himself as a British secret agent in the Middle East than in how he saw his own actions and their consequences. In Pfaff’s subtle reading, Lawrence was trying to live by Edwardian standards of “rectitude, honor, and chastity” that were growing obsolete as big commercial empires fought each other for control of the world. As Pfaff puts it, “The realities of guerrilla war among an Islamic people…were beyond the moral resources of that English conception of life and conduct by which he had set out to live.”

Pfaff shows how Lawrence stayed loyal to his high ethical standards even as the business as usual of empire came to mock his personal commitment to the Arabs. Instead of blaming his superiors or the political system he served, Lawrence assumed personal responsibility for his failure, and led a self-consciously “penitential life.” “Self-degradation is my aim,” he wrote. He wished “to make me impossible for anyone to suggest for a responsible position.” Lawrence seems to have realized that the era of chivalry and individual heroism was past, and that it was merely a form of self-deception to have imagined himself making history while working as a replaceable cog in the ruthless economic and military machines of the modern era—a bitter lesson that the latter-day imitators and versions of Lawrence—the CIA and Special Forces officers looking for their own private Arabia in Afghanistan and Iraq—may yet learn.

2.

Pfaff believes that “the moral function of war” has been to “recall humans to the reality at the core of existence: the violence that is part of our nature and is responsible for the fact that human history is a chronicle of tragedies.” He writes perceptively about Vladimir Peniakoff, a restless, literary-minded Belgian, who found great happiness and contentment in running a private army in the North African desert during the Second World War. Boldly venturing behind enemy lines, Peniakoff seemed almost self-consciously to reject the impersonal ways of modern warfare, which, waged by machines, is mostly about efficient slaughter.

However, André Malraux believed that while it degraded human beings, technology also opened up fresh opportunities for existential heroism. “Man,” he asserted, can “build his greatness, without religion, on the nothingness that crushes him” and the sense of meaninglessness and lack of conviction could drive him to “extreme action.” Upholding Lawrence’s bold mission (“of hustling into form, while I lived, the new Asia which time was inexorably bringing upon us”) Malraux claimed to have helped the Communist revolution in China. He also claimed to have been wounded while fighting in the Spanish civil war, and then was largely an absentee member of the French Resistance during the Nazi occupation of France, before becoming, in his strangest career move, Charles de Gaulle’s cultural minister and emissary to Mao and Nehru.

With his many little deceptions, Malraux resembles the totalitarian thinker whose most significant quality, as Hannah Arendt once defined it, is “extreme contempt for facts as such, for in their opinion fact depends entirely on the power of the man who can fabricate it.” Although, as Pfaff points out, Malraux lied mostly about himself, this engagé intellectual now appears a prototype of the ambitious ideologues of our time who busily create virtual realities for the rest of us, the “reality-based community,” to inhabit—even as the Asia they wish to hustle into form becomes ever more intractable.

It is sobering to think that, as Pfaff says, “the disordered and morally catastrophi century in which the persons in my book live might represent our future and not onl our past.” Toward the end of The Bullet’s Song, Pfaff reconsiders the idea that history is a narrative of progress shaped by human will. He points out that most of the intellectually powerful figures of the last two centuries—Alexis de Tocqueville, Edmund Burke, Jacob Burckhardt, Lord Acton, Reinhold Niebuhr, Raymond Aron, Hannah Arendt, George Kennan—were “hostile to the progressive view of history.” Pfaff believes that there is actual progress only in technology, and he remains skeptical about what it amounts or leads to:

Man has improved in competence, knowledge, and manners. He eats with a fork, uses the computers he has invented to spare him myriad boring tasks, and conducts his wars, when he can, in a way that allows him to avoid the distress of a direct encounter with the pain he inflicts on his victims. This is a form of progress from the axe-wielding and pelt-wearing human past. Western man also today assumes that gadgetry and industry will continue to leap forward in near-geometric progressions. He is beckoned by technology toward a future in which human consciousness is superseded by a more accommodating virtual reality, and invited by economists to a seamless global marketplace that creates ruinous disruptions in the short term allegedly to provide universal happiness in the long term. Where all this will really end, only God would know, should He (She) still exist.
Pfaff notes that despite the ample evidence against them provided by the barbarisms of the twentieth century, “naïve and desiccated versions of the theory of historical progress provide a vocabulary in which the declarations of governments are still phrased, editorials written, and a good deal of the routine work of the academy is conducted.” This may be because what he calls “the myth of secular salvation” had “generally replaced religion in Western high culture” in the nineteenth century. Certainly the current version of this myth—that democracy, free enterprise, globalization, and technology will save humanity from violence and chaos—is now commonplace among powerful elites around the world, invisibly shaping the prejudices and assumptions that an average issue of The Economist, or a column by Thomas Friedman, contains. But as Pfaff put it in Condemned to Freedom,

A faith that the free play of market forces will eventually end in Good is, in fact, more “absurd” than religious belief, for there, at least, there is a presumption of an intelligent Agent Who writes straight with His crooked lines.
Many writers nearing the end of their careers tend to grow pessimistic about th state of the world. But then Pfaff has seen events that grimly vindicate much of wha he has written over the previous four decades, particularly in The Politics of Hysteria, which, though published at the height of the cold war, as a warning against its paranoia and delusion, remains a marvel of intellectual vigor and moral subtlety. Pfaff described in it how “our tangled Western accomplishments of technology, mass movement, popular wealth, and individualism—and of ideology and total war—dominate the contemporary world.” Such extraordinary success provoked foreboding rather than self-congratulation:

In the modern world there is no real alternative to the purposive and aggressive culture of the West. All the other ways by which men have organized their existence and sensibility have been shattered in the past three hundred years by the dual impact upon the world of Western industrialism and political philosophy. The consequence is that the modern West can no longer be quite distinguished from its victims—in short, from the larger modern world.
Such views immediately set Pfaff apart from many Western scholars and writers who try to define what is wrong with Islam, the Middle East, or Muslims by taking the modern West as a superior and largely unquestionable standard—as a culture and civilization existing in splendid isolation from the rest of the world. But then, as Pfaff once wrote about Asia, “the radical and disruptive remaking of its life and society—the challenge to Asians’ understanding of existence itself, made by the West’s four-century-long intrusion—is ignored or simply not understood by Western policymakers and observers.”

Pfaff has not only been aware of the profound social and psychological effects of Western colonialism upon the older societies of Asia and Africa; he also knows how the postcolonial attempt to Westernize these societies, usually seen benignly as a process of “development and progress” in the West itself, is often experienced by its presumed beneficiaries. Writing after September 11, he once again challenged the widely held Western assumption that

everybody must eventually become like us…. Westernization, to westerners, means liberation…. For people in other societies, westernization frequently means destruction, social and moral crisis, with individuals cast adrift in a destructured and literally demoralized world. Cultural and political disorientation, violent resistance to the intruder, and attempts to recapture a lost golden age are natural reactions to this. We see all of this today.
Pfaff has always insisted that “really to understand the contemporary political crisis it is necessary to understand the West; it is the Western world which has made the modern crisis, because it is the West which has made the modern world.” In his complex view, radical Islam in the Middle East and religious-political fundamentalism in America appear not so much as eruptions of a medieval religiosity as deeply materialist ideologies that strive for secular rather than spiritual power in the modern world that the West made. Pfaff doesn’t think it likely that “the non-western world, its own traditions pulverized, [will] cope any better than we with the destructive impulses of the modern political and industrial life that we ourselves originated.” As he wrote in The Politics of Hysteria, four decades before September 11:

If it is true that the West has characteristic crimes in its past, as well as those manifest virtues we are quick to acknowledge, then we must face the possibility that a disposition to these crimes—primarily a crime of ideological violence —is neither burned out in our West itself nor precluded in those vaster regions of the world now being swept into the ambiguous experiences of our own disordered Western past.
Almost half a century after Pfaff wrote this, the non-Western world appears full o botched experiments in Western-style nation-states, with millions of people uproote from tradition but still far from the benefits of modern society and increasingl susceptible to political and religious extremism. However, neither the so-called faile states nor radical Islam-ists threaten the West in the long term as much as the ol countries that are widely perceived as successes of Westernization: India and China

As they make themselves over in the image of Western consumer societies, these populous nations seek a progressively larger share of the world’s energy resources that the West, particularly the United States, has monopolized for so long.[5] Rising American demand for oil imports after the Second World War deepened US involvement in the Middle East; the growing energy needs of India and China will no doubt make them assertive beyond South and East Asia. And just as a newly Westernized and ambitious Japan in the early twentieth century had challenged the West, so India and China are likely to become more aggressive with the nations they emulate at present. Pfaff had warned in Barbarian Sentiments that continued American military presence in Asia is likely to lead to a conflict with China. More Asian nations armed with nuclear weapons may also seek to undermine the long supremacy of the West.

Alarmed at this prospect, many policymakers and pundits in the West find consoling the American neoconservative vision of a “United States whose military power was so awesome that it no longer needed to make compromises or accommodations (unless it chose to do so) with any other nation or groups of countries.”[6] No amount of awesome military power seems likely to realize this dangerously naive vision of a “unipolar world.” But, as Andrew Bacevich, a foreign policy analyst who, like Pfaff, served in the US military, writes in his new book, The New American Militarism, the “collision between American requirements and a non-compliant world…may well doom the United States to fight perpetual wars.”

Bacevich thinks that these wars will be justified to the American public and the larger world “in terms of ideals rather than interests.” Pfaff also sees a future of “totally self-interested power struggles,” which are disguised by the rhetoric of democracy and free enterprise. It makes him more partial to a politics that looks for “solutions within, rather than without, in experienced reality rather than imagination about the future.” He believes that a society’s first task is to attend to its own imperfections: “The only thing we can remake is ourselves.” On the next-to-last pages of The Bullet’s Song, he quotes George Kennan: “Any message we try to bring to others will be effective only if it is in accord with what we are to ourselves.” Pfaff agrees with Kennan that “despite all its material difficulties,” the world is still ready to recognize and respect “spiritual distinction” in a nation.

“Spiritual distinction” may not appear to advance the national interest, such as it is defined these days. And Pfaff’s belief that “the pursuit of virtue” is “the only proper pursuit for a human being” is likely to look quaint to foreign policy analysts—closer to the truth of the Mahabharata, as Gandhi saw it, or to the wisdom of the classical Greeks, than to the imperatives of US foreign policy. But it explains why he has remained, for over four decades, immune to the delusions that power as great as America’s invariably creates —what now makes him a persuasive, if melancholy, guide to the new politics of hysteria that threatens to make the new century even bloodier than the one just past.

Notes

[1] “My Jail Experiences—XI,” Young India, September 11, 1924, in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), Vol. 29, pp. 134–135; available at www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html.

[2] For a stimulating account of the many perceptions of history see R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford University Press, revised 1993). See also Hannah Arendt, “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern,” in Between Past and Future (Viking, 1961).

[3] The Rebel, translated by Anthony Bower (Penguin, 1971), p. 11.

[4] The best-selling book by Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger (Random House, 2003), celebrates some of the CIA and Special Forces officers and their Afghan beneficiaries. But the book seems to have required drastic revision since last year when one of its heroes, Jack Idema, was caught while torturing Afghan civilians in Kabul. Idema is presently serving eight years in a Kabul prison. See Mariah Blake, “Tin Soldier: An American Vigilante in Afghanistan, Using the Press for Profit and Glory,” Columbia Journalism Review, January–February 2005.

[5] The United States now consumes one out of four barrels of oil produced worldwide. In the period up to 2020, China is likely to match America’s demand for oil. With its growing middle class, India is unlikely to be very far behind. See “Rivals and Partners,” The Economist, March 5, 2005.

[6] James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (Viking, 2004), p. xii.

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Musical Notes September 13, 2006

Posted by khalidmir in Music.
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In the beginning was the deed not the word. But before that was sound. Do we ever have access to that hidden origin, is it possible to speak about the impossible? Is life anything but the search for that unseen centre, anything but the attempt to translate the mystery back into words, culture? We think about it, conceptualise it but music -like life-flows on, saying everything and nothing. Life without music would be a mistake.

Is music anything more than pleasure? A way of forgetting or a way of remembering a deeper past? And she holds beauty and reticience, the enduring and the ephemeral, the physical and the metaphysical in both hands.Harmony is beauty and number, passion and discipline. A sound thought. Where does thought begin and where does it end? Music doesn’t start with the first note, but rather from the silence from which it emerges. Something always precedes the origin. What is the relation between 0 and 1 except one of strict discontinuity. But it is, paradoxically, a relation neverthe less. Is this relation a ‘law’ or does it follow its own trajectory with any freedom? who can answer such a question. All one can say is that if the note is not sustained then it will ‘fall’ back to nothingness. Without an effort of will and memory it dies and this is the beginning of a tragic story. Gravity and grace, snakes and ladders…the old themes. Music is always in the process of becoming: it never is ; its fleetingness is an escape from the world, all that is not present, but it is also an evocation of what can be or what was and points , therefore, to hope and memory.

Possibilities. All music is generated from the same twelve notes, the same fundamental structure; the universe is composed by some combination of them. We instinctively grasp the mood of some music because we too are a series of such notes. Unity and diversity. The hands, heart and mind work together in a blessed state. Humaneness is not a completed score, but a performance. Structure and logic, without the human touch, descends into the totalitarian and all that stifles creativity. That ‘giving’ , the human quality par excellence, is what helps a note as it is about to die; it is why a note can transcend life. Is music an attempt to control time, to find that special moment, that peaceful place, and freeze it or is it a striving to be time itself, to unlock closely guarded secrets and unbind the will.

Two Hands September 12, 2006

Posted by khalidmir in Hands.
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Quintessence. n. 1. Most refined part of any substance, refined extract; purest and most perfect form, manifestation, or embodiment of some quality or class. 2. (Ancient Philosophy) Fifth substance (besides the four elements) forming heavenly bodies and pervading all things. 3. Hence quintessential [Medieval English] in sense 2., f. F, f med. L. ‘quinta essentia’ fifth essence.

The quintessential is all that eludes definition.

Als das Kind Kind war,
warf es einen Stock als Lanze gegen den Baum,
und sie zittert da heute noch

Each act, each act of perception, discloses something of our style of soul-whether we would know it or not. Each movement of the hand is a self-revealing gesture of the soul and bears witness to what and who we are. The poet would say:

My eyes have seen

what my hand did

There is no disjunction between thought and action, self and the world and a semblance of unity is achieved. We strive wholeheartedly to find this innermost self, this image of perfection and completion haunts us; to touch all that comes our way and imprint on it something of our unique essence. But this emphasis on knowing who we are is doomed to failure for our path, unlike that of the stars, can only be traced when it have run its course.  It is a line still being drawn…the ink is not dry.

Augustine would say that we can only know what we are, not who we are; that only God can know. There are acts which the left hand should not know, that should be done in silence, that must be suffered…and lest it be forgotten: God created us with Two Hands.

Have we not darkened and dazed ourselves with books long enough?—-A Passage to India.

But this is not a simple return to innocence-it is an achieved naivete, an ability to sustain ourselves beyond sadness. The innocence of doves and the wisdom of serpents.

Creation: the earth still trembles to this day, the steam still rises from the seas, the clouds still hover over the mountains, remembering their former lives; the light still streams forth from beyond yonder and unploughed fields hold the dreams of palaces. Everything is a running flame. Only from a distance does thought see this as the geometric perfection of an architect. A sense of something utterly completed vied with a sense of something startled into scope and freedom. When we close the books we acknowledge that within matter itself a space is reserved for a mysterious element that opens up infinite possibilities. It is life itself that is this fusion of the mathematical and the biological, the interplay of thought and feeling, and it is life that forms the warp and woof of the universe, that sets us riddles and offers us answers, that is both chaos and order. We may know something of that order of being but we remain, quintessentially, unknown.